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ABSTRACT
In the summer of 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the state legislature’s
cap on non-economic damages violated the state constitution’s right to trial by jury.
In doing so, the Kansas high court overturned its own precedent in Miller v. Johnson, finding that the “inviolate” right to trial by jury is not subject to legislative
meddling. Kansas also joined several other states, including Missouri, in rejecting
a strained fact-law distinction employed by most states which uphold such caps in
the face of right to jury challenges against the backdrop of “inviolate” constitutional
language.
There is little to no “rational basis” for enacting these caps in the first place. Accordingly, courts should consider adopting the stronger “rational basis with bite”
standard of review suggested by Judge Stegall’s Hilburn concurrence, which would
free courts from adhering to dubious precedent upholding caps on “procedural”
grounds, and demand that statutes curtailing substantial constitutional rights maintain a legitimate connection to public welfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Louis Brandeis opined in his dissent to the U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.”1 During the summer of 2019, Kansas re-entered the fray
of a nationwide debate regarding the constitutionality and economic legitimacy of
legislative caps on non-economic damages, and distanced itself from a novel and
controversial approach to legislative damage caps adopted seven years prior.2 Following the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., nine states
maintain caps on non-economic damages in general tort or personal injury cases,
nine maintain them in products liability cases, and 24 states maintain them in medical malpractice cases.3 Six states enforce caps on total damages in medical malpractice cases.4 In the remainder of states, caps have either not been passed or have
been found unconstitutional.5
Damage caps shift an advantage from injured plaintiffs, who are otherwise able
to obtain full compensation, to insurance companies who reap increased certainty
and decreased payouts.6 The legitimacy of these caps and their ability to survive
scrutiny provides serious implications for the business and legal communities. 7
Caps on non-economic damages theoretically affect the rate of premiums offered
by insurers, impacting their business decisions and bottom line. 8 These premiums
in turn affect the business operations of insureds—such as physicians who may
avoid certain procedures—otherwise beneficial to society, due to fear of litigation
and increased premiums.9 The Congressional Budget Office has suggested that
damage caps in medical malpractice would also indirectly reduce consumer
healthcare costs by limiting defensive medicine, a practice whereby physicians prescribe excess medical services under the pressure of potential lawsuits. 10 The “tort
reform” initiatives that have ushered in these caps are often justified as a component

1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
2. See Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509 (Kan. 2019).
3. Fact Sheet: Caps on Compensatory Damages, CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY N.Y.C. L. SCH.
(June 20, 2019), https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-caps-compensatory-damages-state-law-summary#_ftnref5.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part VI.
7. Ronen Avraham & Alvaro Bustos, The unexpected results of caps on non-economic damages,
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1 (2010), https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/ravraham/unexpected-effects-ofcaps.pdf.
8. Kevin McManus, Finding A Cure for High Medical Malpractice Premiums: The Limits of Missouri’s Damage Cap and the Need for Regulation, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 895, 913–15 (2005).
9. “Defensive medicine in simple words is departing from normal medical practice as a safeguard
from litigation. It occurs when a medical practitioner performs treatment or procedure to avoid exposure
to malpractice litigation. Defensive medicine is damaging for its potential to poses health risks to the
patient. Furthermore, it increases the healthcare costs.” M. Sonal Sekhar & N. Vyas, Defensive Medicine:
A
Bane
to
Healthcare,
ANNALS
MED.
&
HEALTH
SCI.
RES.
(2013),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3728884/.
10. Cost Estimate for H.R. 1215, Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Mar.
22, 2017), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52518; See also Sekhar & Vyas, supra note 9.
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of a pro-business agenda.11 Constitutionality aside, there is debate among legal and
economic scholars as to whether these caps achieve their stated goal of providing
certainty to insurers and lower premiums for physicians and consumers. 12 The results are mixed.13
Part II of this article lays out the legal background to Kansas’ Hilburn decision.
This background includes discussion of the national landscape concerning damage
cap jurisprudence, particularly with respect to that of Missouri. Part II also explores
the justifications underlying Miller v. Johnson, the 2012 case in which Kansas initially upheld their statutory damage caps.14 Of particular interest in that case is the
now-abandoned “quid pro quo” approach to Constitutional infringements. Part III
of this article explores Hilburn in depth and explains the rationale supporting the
decision. Part IV of this article pays special attention to a controversial “fact-law”
distinction at the center of most opinions which uphold legislative caps on jurydetermined damages, including the ongoing debate concerning this principle. Part
V of this article discusses the right to a trial by jury as it existed at common law,
which is of supreme import in states with constitutions that protect this right as
“inviolate.” Part VI of this article explores questions presented by the Hilburn decision, including the economic rationale underlying the legislative enactment of
damage caps. Finally, Part VII of this article provides potential solutions for states
considering the constitutional validity of legislative damage caps in the wake of
Hilburn.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Nearly all states that have enacted non-economic damage caps have experienced constitutional challenges to the judicial limitation, most frequently on the
basis of the right to trial by jury.15 Although § 5 of the Kansas Bill of Rights provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall be inviolate,” 16 the Kansas legislature
imposed a statutory cap on non-economic damages in 1988.17 Under this statute,
recovery by each party for non-economic loss in any personal injury action was
limited to $250,000, which was to incrementally grow to $350,000 by 2022. 18 In
11. Michelle Andrews, This GOP Health Bill Proposes New Limits To Medical Malpractice Awards¸
NPR (JUNE 28, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/06/28/534465478/this-gophealth-bill-proposes-new-limits-to-medical-malpractice-awards.
12. Kelly Kotur, An Extreme Response or A Necessary Reform? Revealing How Caps on Noneconomic Damages Actually Affect Medical Malpractice Victims and Malpractice Insurance Rates, 108 W.
VA. L. REV. 873, 892–93 (2006).
13. Compare H.E. Frech III, An Economic Assessment of Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice Litigation Imposed by State Laws and the Implications for Federal Policy and Law, 16 HEALTH MATRIX
693, 695-707 (2006) (explaining how caps reduce incentive to bring lawsuits and should reduce premiums), with Michael A. Morrisey, Medical Malpractice Reform and Employer‐Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums, HEALTH SERV. RES. (2008) (claiming there is “no statistically significant evidence that
noneconomic damage caps exerted any meaningful influence on the cost of employer‐sponsored health
insurance.”).
14. See generally Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098 (Kan. 2012).
15. Christopher R. Staley, Comment, Bypassing the Bill of Rights-the Kansas Supreme Court’s Use
of Quid Pro Quo to Analyze the Inviolate Right to Trial by Jury (Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098 (Kan.
2012)), 53 WASHBURN L.J. 147, 157 (2013).
16. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5.
17. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (West 2018), invalidated by Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509
(Kan. 2019).
18. Id.
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2012, a medical malpractice plaintiff challenged the cap’s constitutionality in Miller
v. Johnson, under a right to trial by jury theory, pursuant to § 5 of the Kansas Bill
of Rights.19 The Miller court upheld the cap by extending to § 5 challenges the “quid
pro quo” test utilized by the court in § 18 right to remedy challenges. 20
Section 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights provides that “[a]ll persons, for injuries
suffered in person, reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law,
and justice administered without delay.”21 The Kansas Supreme Court has repeatedly utilized a quid pro quo analysis to allow legislative alteration to a plaintiff’s
remedy.22 However, unlike § 5, § 18 does not enshrine the right as “inviolate.” 23
The quid pro quo test upholds a judicial limitation imposed by the legislature if it
satisfies two prongs: (1) as applied, the limitation is reasonably necessary in the
public interest, and (2) the legislature provides “an adequate substitute remedy” for
impairment of Constitutional rights.24 In extending the quid pro quo test to challenges pursuant to the § 5 right to trial by jury, the Miller court held the cap was
“reasonably necessary to promote the public welfare” because it operates in the
“broader scheme of mandatory insurance,” and the state has an interest in the availability and affordability of that insurance.25 This holding rested on the assumption,
explored below, that damage caps have a meaningful relationship with consumer
premium costs.26 The court also argued that overturning application of quid pro quo
would require dismantling the Kansas workers’ compensation and no-fault insurance systems.27 In so holding, Miller determined that, despite the Kansas Supreme
Court’s consistent determination that § 5 “preserves the jury trial right as it historically existed at common law” at the time of the Kansas Constitution’s ratification, 28
the “inviolate” right to a trial by jury is not inviolate, but instead subject to subsequent legislative modification.29 The right to jury trial as it existed at common law
and the legislature’s ability to alter the common law are more directly taken up
below.30
Miller’s extension of quid pro quo analysis to the right to trial by jury was
controversial.31 Kansas Supreme Court Judge Carol Beier’s concurring opinion in
Miller refused to adopt the majority’s constitutional analysis and “mystifying” application of quid pro quo to justify an abridgement of a constitutional right, stating
her desire to “kick [quid pro quo] to the curb where it always belonged.”32 Curiously, Kansas had distinguished itself prior to Hilburn as the only state to approach
19. See generally Miller, 289 P.3d at 1106.
20. Id. at 1113.
21. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 18.
22. See., e.g., Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 555 (Kan. 1990) (“Due process
requires that the legislature substitute the viable statutory remedy of quid pro quo (this for that) to replace
the loss of the right.”).
23. Compare KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5, with KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 18.
24. Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 512 (Kan. 2019).
25. Miller, 289 P.3d at 1114.
26. See infra Part VI..
27. Miller, 289 P.3d at 1144 (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. Id. at 1108 (majority opinion).
29. Id. at 1110 (“The decisions of this court are replete with instances of common-law rights being
modified or abolished.” (quoting Manzanares v. Bell, 522 P.3d 1291, 1301 (Kan. 1974))).
30. See infra Part V.
31. Staley, supra note 15, at 175 (“[T]he court’s reliance on the quid pro quo analysis to a right to trial
by jury challenge was flawed.”).
32. Miller, 239 P.3d at 1132 (Beier, J., concurring); Id. at 1138.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol4/iss1/49

4

Rhatican: No Cap: Analyzing the Kansas Supreme Court’s Decision to Overturn

No. 1]

Rhatican: Hilburn and Non-Economic Damage Caps

201

caps with a quid pro quo inquiry regarding constitutionality. 33 Although Justice
Brandeis once acknowledged that “[d]enial of the right to experiment may be
fraught with serious consequences to the nation,”34 commentators suggested in the
aftermath of Miller that perhaps Kansas should have looked to its neighbors for
guidance.35
Months before the Miller decision, the Missouri Supreme Court also addressed
a constitutional challenge to statutory damage caps, and returned a verdict contrary
to that of its western neighbor by finding the cap unconstitutional.36 The court, also
analyzing constitutional language enshrining the right to trial by jury as “inviolate,”37 determined that the cap at issue “directly curtails the jury’s determination of
damages and, as a result, necessarily infringes on the right to trial by jury.”38

III. THE HILBURN DECISION
Seven years after Miller, Judge Beier was able to pen the majority opinion in
Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., a landmark 2019 case overturning Kansas Supreme Court
precedent and invalidating the legislature’s 1988 cap as unconstitutional.39 Hilburn
was decided against the backdrop of a recently tempered presumption of statutory
constitutionality with regard to “fundamental interests.”40 This foundational change
in Kansas jurisprudence eroded the Miller court’s justification in relying heavily on
stare decisis in upholding the cap,41 which validated Judge Beier’s qualms with the
Miller decision and paved the way to the cap’s demise. 42 The Hilburn majority,
acknowledging this changed landscape, held that “in such cases, the presumption
of constitutionality does not apply.”43
Without upsetting the use of quid pro quo analysis in § 18 challenges, 44 the
Hilburn court overturned Miller’s holding that this analysis could be extended to §
5 without running afoul of the Kansas Constitution and the “inviolate” status of the
right to trial by jury.45 In doing so, Hilburn held that § 5 provides more than a right
33. Staley, supra note 15, at 173 (“The Kansas Supreme Court is the only state supreme court in the
United States to apply a quid pro quo test in determining whether a noneconomic damages cap violates
the right to trial by jury.”).
34. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandies, J., dissenting).
35. Staley, supra note 15, at 173.
36. See Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs, 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Mo. banc 2012).
37. Id. at 637 (citing MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a)).
38. Id. at 640.
39. See generally Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 524 (Kan. 2019).
40. See generally Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 499 (Kan. 2019) (“A more stringent test
has emerged, however, in cases involving ‘suspect classifications’ or ‘fundamental interests.’” (quoting
State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 576 P.2d 221, 227 (Kan. 1978))).
41. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 519 (“The Miller majority also asserted that the cost-benefit analysis involved
in evaluating the wisdom of following precedent favored application of a quid pro quo test to analysis
of section 5 claims.”).
42. Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1141–44 (Kan. 2012) (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. See Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 513.
44. Appellate Court Digests, KAN. B. ASS’N (June 14, 2019), https://www.ksbar.org/blogpost/1618780/326236/June-14-2019-Digests (“The section 5 right to jury trial is completely distinct
from the section 18 right to remedy. A statutory cap substitutes the legislature’s nonspecific judgment
for a jury’s specific judgment. This runs afoul of the constitution’s grant of an “inviolate” right to a
jury.”).
45. See Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 514.
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to empanel a jury.46 The court cited Beier’s Miller concurrence in finding that the
Kansas Constitution placed the right to a jury determination of damages “beyond
everyday legislative meddling. The people entrusted juries with the task of deciding
damages.”47 In effect, the Kansas Supreme Court distanced itself from its reliance
on the fact-law distinction in Miller.48 Hilburn rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the court should follow the lead of the majority of other states, such as
Virginia,49 which have upheld their caps on the basis of a rather technical fact-law
distinction.50 Instead, unlike in Miller, the Hilburn court was persuaded by the Kansas Constitution’s protection of the right to trial by jury as “inviolate.”51 As a result,
Hilburn determined that the disturbance of the jury’s finding of fact with regard to
the amount of the award was an impermissible encroachment on the jury’s obligation to determine damages and ran afoul of § 5.52 Specifically, Hilburn took issue
with the suggestion that the legislature’s “general” determination could be an adequate substitute for the “specific” determination of a jury.53 For this encroachment
on the inviolate right to a trial by jury, Hilburn found the legislature’s cap on noneconomic damages facially unconstitutional.54
It is important to note that the Hilburn decision did not overturn the cap in
actions for wrongful death or punitive damages.55 Although the opinion does not
expressly state this exception, the court’s § 5 analysis is couched in preserving the
right to trial by jury as it existed at the time the Kansas Constitution was ratified in
1859.56 The Kansas Supreme Court has “consistently held that the determination of
noneconomic damages” fits this criteria.57 The statute providing a cause of action
for wrongful death, for example, was not passed until 1963,58 and though the legislature has the power to alter the common law with enactments such as that providing
for wrongful death suits, it may not modify that which has been granted

46. Id. at 515 (“Giving the jury ‘a practically meaningless opportunity to assess damages simply ‘pays
lip service to the form of the jury but robs it of its function.’” (quoting Miller, 289 P.3d. at 1136)).
47. Id. at 516.
48. Miller, 289 P.3d at 1136 (“Rather than stating in a straightforward way that K.S.A. 60–19a02 does
impair the Section 5 right to jury trial, the majority feints toward then-Justice Kay McFarland’s position
in her concurrence in Samsel II that the right to jury trial does not extend to the remedy phase of trial.”).
49. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 521.
50. Id. at 521–24 (“For example, in Virginia, the Supreme Court has said, ‘The resolution of disputed
facts continues to be a jury’s sole function. ‘The province of the jury is to settle questions of fact, and
when the facts are ascertained the law determines the rights of the parties.’ Thus, the Virginia Constitution guarantees only that a jury will resolve disputed facts.”).
51. Id. at 523 (“[W]e simply cannot square a right specially designated by the people as ‘inviolate’
with the practical effect of the damages cap: substituting juries’ factual determinations of actual damages
with an across-the-board legislative determination of the maximum conceivable amount of actual damages.”).
52. Id. at 524.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 514; Chris Tillery, Kansas Supreme Court Overturns Statutory Cap On “Pain and Suffering” And Other Noneconomic Damages In Personal Injury Cases, SEIGFREID BINGHAM, http://www.sbkc.com/news/2019/06/kansas-supreme-court-overturns-statutory-cap-on-pain-and-suffering-and-othernoneconomic-damages-in-personal-injury-cases/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2020).
56. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 514.
57. Id.
58. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 (West 2018), invalidated by Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509
(Kan. 2019).
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constitutional protections, as was the existing Kansas common law upon ratification
of the Kansas constitution.59

IV. THE FACT-LAW DISTINCTION
When reviewing the reasoning in the Miller and Hilburn decisions, it is important to keep in mind that the now-abrogated quid pro quo approach to § 5 was
unique to Kansas’ constitutional jurisprudence.60 Most courts take a different analytical path.61 As the majority in Hilburn acknowledges, “[t]he fact-law or fact-policy distinction has been relied on in varying degrees by almost all courts that have
upheld damages caps in the face of jury trial-based challenges.”62
Courts upholding caps on the basis of the fact-law distinction find that the “trial
court’s application of law to the facts” as found by a jury does not impede a plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury.63 In her dissent in Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, the Missouri Supreme Court case that overturned Missouri’s caps, Judge Mary
Rhodes Russell argued that the cap merely represented the “substantive legal limits
of a plaintiff’s damage remedy,” and the cap was, therefore, an appropriate legislative activity regarding a matter of law, as opposed to a matter of fact safely within
the jury’s discretion and the protection of the right to trial by jury. 64 This dissent
followed Missouri precedent prior to the Watts decision, which upheld caps under
the theory that the jury performed its proper role in assessing damages, and “[o]nly
after the jury had performed its constitutional fact-finding duty would the court apply the substantive law (e.g., damage caps) to those facts.”65 As Russell saw it, once
the jury had determined the fact of damages, it had “completed its constitutional
task,” and it fell to the court to apply the law.66 This argument is perhaps at its most
extreme in finding “the jury serves no function other than providing an individual
his right to a trial by jury,” and that the cap does not prevent the jury from “assessing
damages,” only from awarding them.67 Russell cited the reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, which found that “[s]o long as the
fact-finding process is not intruded upon and the resulting findings of fact are not
ignored or replaced by another body’s findings, awards may be altered as a matter
of law.”68

59. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 516; accord Dodson v. Ferrara, 491 S.W.3d 542, 554 (Mo. banc 2016)
(“Sanders court recognized that wrongful death is a purely statutory cause of action that did not exist at
common law. As a result, ‘the legislature has the authority to choose what remedies will be permitted’
because it created the cause of action.”).
60. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 521 (“[L]ooking beyond our state borders, we note that, at the time Miller
was decided, 19 states had addressed whether damages caps violated their state’s constitutional jury
protections, and not one had employed the quid pro quo test in its analysis.”).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 521-22.
63. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633, 649 (Mo. banc 2012) (Russell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id.
65. David F. Maron, Statutory Damage Caps: Analysis of the Scope of Right to Jury Trial and the
Constitutionality of Mississippi Statutory Caps on Noneconomic Damages, 32 MISS. C. L. REV. 109, 117
(2013).
66. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 649.
67. Id. at 650.
68. Id. at 651 (citing Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 431 (Ohio 2007)).
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Despite the reliance on this distinction by most states upholding legislative caps
against “inviolate” right to trial by jury challenges, 69 the Watts majority refused to
use this distinction to curtail a plaintiff’s right to a jury’s full and fair determination
of damages,70 citing a long recognition in Missouri that finding damages is amongst
the jury’s primary duties.71 The legislative cap’s “wholly independent” operation
from the facts rendered it directly at odds with a jury finding of damages. 72 As a
result, the cap “necessarily infringes” on the right to a trial by jury,73 a right that is
“substantial and valuable” and should be “carefully guarded against infringements.”74 To hold otherwise “would make constitutional protections of only theoretical value—they would exist only unless and until limited by the legislature.”75
Despite acknowledging the “historical applicability of Section 5 to commonlaw tort actions,” and that “the right of trial by jury shall be and remain as ample
and complete as it was at the time when the constitution was adopted,”76 Kansas’
Miller majority reached the conclusion that legislative prerogative and availability
of a substitute remedy excused an encroachment on the jury’s determination as it
existed at common law.77 It was this point in particular that alienated Judge Beier.78
Judge Stegall’s concurring opinion in Hilburn expressed his view that the factlaw distinction deserved more attention in the court’s analysis. 79 His opinion
acknowledged an “oblique” reference by the attorney general that a principal question to be addressed is whether the imposition of a cap on non-economic damages
is substantive or procedural.80 Stegall found that the legislature’s insistence that the
jury not be advised of the cap indicated an attempt to effect a “procedural interference with the inviolate right to a jury protected by section 5,”81 as opposed to a
substantive modification of the cause of action.82 This action impermissibly substituted the legislature’s judgment for that of the jury.83 In doing so, the legislature
“changed who decides, not what is being decided.”84 Had the legislature instead
effected a substantive change, the enactment would have been subject to the more
permissive § 18 “right to remedy” analysis.85

69. Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 522 (Kan. 2019).
70. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 640 (majority opinion).
71. Id. at 639.
72. Id. at 640.
73. Id.
74. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 513.
75. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 643.
76. Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1137 (Kan. 2012) (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting the majority’s concession toward the viability of the right to trial by jury).
77. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 521 (citing the majority holding in Miller, 289 P.3d at 1117–18).
78. Miller, 289 P.3d at 1136 (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is after its agreement on these two irrefutable points that the majority first goes astray.”).
79. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 526 (Stegall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 525.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 526.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 525.
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V. RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW
Hilburn held that § 5 preserves the right to trial by jury as it existed at common
law at the time of constitutional ratification.86 A “fundamental” component of this
right included the determination of non-economic damages.87 The court found this
right could not remain “inviolate” so long as an aggrieved plaintiff is not afforded
“the jury’s constitutionally assigned role of determining damages.” 88 The majority
found company in a like-minded Missouri Supreme Court, which held that giving
the jury a “practically meaningless opportunity” to assess damages merely “pays lip
service to the form of the jury but robs it of its function.” 89 Instead, Kansans enshrined inflexible protection of the right to a trial by jury in their state constitution
because “the people recognized the right to jury trial required protection from legislative efforts to modify it in ways that destroy the substance of that right.” 90
Despite agreeing “as a purely technical, theoretical matter” that legislatively
applying a damage cap to a jury finding of factual damages is a matter of law, Hilburn held that the effect of this application is to improperly assign the determination
of damages to someone or something other than the jury, whom the people of Kansas selected for this task in ratifying the Kansas Constitution. 91 Furthermore, although the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has not been incorporated
to the states,92 Hilburn cited U.S. Supreme Court authority that more jury deference
is to be afforded in the case of non-economic damages due to their less certain nature.93
Courts in states like Kansas are quick to recognize that legislatures have the
power to alter the common law,94 including the right to a jury assessment of damages.95 To hold otherwise would severely curtail a legislature’s power to enact or
alter laws.96 Despite this legislative authority, Hilburn adeptly pointed out the “fundamental” distinction between mere rights at common law, and the special class of
common law rights that were specifically granted protection by the Kansas Constitution.97 Hilburn cited the U.S. Supreme Court in finding the common law is typically flexible, but not in cases of constitutional protection of the right as it existed
upon enshrinement.98 In such cases, the court “is dealing with a constitutional provision that has in effect adopted the rules of the common law, in respect of trial by
jury, as those rules existed” at the time of constitutional ratification.99 An alteration

86. Id. at 514 (majority opinion).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 514–15.
89. Id. at 515 (quoting Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs, 376 S.W.3d 633, 642 (Mo. banc 2012)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 523.
92. Id. (“United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Seventh Amendment’s scope in civil trials, while not binding on the states, also provides some insight.”).
93. Id. at 523–24 (citing Dimick v. Schiedt 293 U.S. 474, 479 (1935)).
94. Id. at 525 (Stegall, J., concurring).
95. Maron, supra note 65, at 119 (“It follows that the power to abolish causes of action includes the
power to abolish causes of action for damages in amounts of above the statutory limit.”).
96. Id.
97. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 516 (majority opinion).
98. Id. (citing Dimick v. Schiedt 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935)).
99. Id.
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of these rules is in fact not an alteration of the common law, but of the constitution
itself.100
In overturning Missouri’s cap, the Watts court determined that the “heretofore
enjoyed” language of Missouri’s constitution provided an entitlement to a jury trial
“in actions to which they would have been entitled to a jury when the Missouri
Constitution was adopted.”101 The court found that statutory caps on damages
“simply did not exist and were not contemplated by the common law” when Missourians ratified their constitution.102 As a result, the right to a jury “as heretofore
enjoyed” is not subject to legislative limits on jury-determined damages.103 Hilburn
cited Watts and like-minded states extensively in determining that “[g]iving the legislature the authority to limit damages by changing the common law, or otherwise,
violates § 5 of the Kansas Bill of Rights by taking the damage question away from
the jury.”104

VI. QUESTIONING THE CAP’S PURPOSE
Following this decision, one may reasonably expect a sizable economic effect
on consumers as insurance carriers brace for uncertainty and potentially massive
judgments.105 Following the opinion in Hilburn, many commentators predicted the
worst, suggesting “the ruling will open the floodgates to high-dollar lawsuits that
will drive up the cost of care for everyone.”106 Others lamented that the cap had
“been effective in keeping costs down for small business owners” and produced a
more favorable legal climate than Missouri, where a lack of caps “affected patient
care and business costs.”107
Nevertheless, the research on this issue is largely nonconclusive and filled with
cherry-picked data that is often unreliable.108 On one hand, some economic scholars
argue that “[e]conomic principles, markets, and the results of empirical research
indicate caps are effective in reducing medical liability insurance costs, thereby reducing health care costs.”109 The limited size of possible judgments reduces the incentive to bring lawsuits for personal injury and medical malpractice, promoting
judicial economy.110 For example, modeling suggests a non-economic damage cap
100. Id.
101. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 637-38 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting State ex
rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Mo. banc 2003)).
102. Id. at 639.
103. Id.
104. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 516 (quoting Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 562
(1990) (Herd, J., dissenting)).
105. Andy Marso, Kansas Patients Can Now Win Big in Doctor Malpractice Suits, CLAIMS J. (July 11,
2019), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/midwest/2019/07/11/291924.htm (“The Kansas Medical
Society, which represents doctors, said the state ‘has enjoyed a stable medical malpractice environment
for many years’ but that was about to change thanks to the ‘unfortunate and costly decision by the
court.’”).
106. Id.
107. John Breslin, Business leaders bothered by Kansas Supreme Court’s ‘awful’ decision to remove
cap on damages, LEGAL NEWSLINE (June 28, 2019), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/512673594-business-leaders-bothered-by-kansas-supreme-court-s-awful-decision-to-remove-cap-on-damages.
108. Francisco F. Guzman Andrade, Comment, Tort Reform—How the Phrase “As Heretofore Enjoyed” Subjected Wrongful Death Plaintiffs to Noneconomic Damages Caps in Missouri, 70 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 983, 987 n.30 (2018) (analyzing Dodson v. Ferrara, 491 S.W.3d 542 (Mo. banc 2016)).
109. Frech III, supra note 13, at 696.
110. Id.
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of $250,000 may actually provide a medical malpractice plaintiff, such as that in
Hilburn, with a negative expected recovery when considering the astronomical cost
of pursuing the litigation.111 On the other hand, despite the diminished incentives,
caps do not seem to have a practical effect on judicial efficiency, as “[d]amage limits do not significantly reduce the number of lawsuits filed.” 112
In addition to judicial economy, legislatures have the effect on insurers and
consumers in mind when enacting caps.113 As above, the efficacy of caps in achieving this goal is unclear. Although modeling suggests caps “should” reduce insurance premiums,114 this is not certain in practice. For example, despite surviving a
pair of constitutional challenges in 1985,115 California’s cap on non-economic damages failed to prevent climbing insurance rates.116 Scholars suggest that a meaningful correlation between damage caps and insurance premiums is hard to come by.117
The lack of empirical consensus that caps keep costs down in exchange for the extreme burden placed on victims is of grave concern, as ineffective legislation would
mean that “insurance companies reap increased profits through windfall legislation
that reduces their exposure, while the pain and disability of malpractice victims
persists uncapped.”118
Many criticize the practice of imposing these caps in pursuit of the elusive goal
of lowering premiums, as “damage caps, as currently implemented in the United
States, are an ineffective means of resolving the medical malpractice crises that repeatedly plague the insurance system.”119 As another example of the failure of caps
on non-economic damages to reign in soaring insurance premiums, between 2002
and 2003, Missouri saw a precipitous decline in non-economic damage awards
reaching the state’s cap, with a record low of five judgments in 2003 as well as a
reduction in the amount of economic damage awards exceeding $1 million. 120 Despite the falling payouts, “medical malpractice insurance premiums doubled, rising
from $113.5 to $227 million,” a record high.121 Former Missouri Insurance Director
Jay Angoff found that the 15 largest medical malpractice insurers nationwide doubled their premiums from 2000 through 2004, despite an unremarkable change in
payouts.122
The now-abrogated Miller decision, which upheld caps in Kansas just months
following Missouri’s invalidation of the same,123 allowed for a post-Watts and pre-

111. Id. at 700.
112. Id.
113. Frank A. Perrecone & Lisa R. Fabiano, The Fleecing of Seriously Injured Medical Malpractice
Victims in Illinois, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527, 530 (2006); McManus, supra note 8, at 905.
114. Frech III, supra note 13, at 706-07 (“Imposing caps on the states which currently do not have them
would have reduced loss payments in 2004 by approximately $251 million.”).
115. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1437 (1985); Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d
665, 683 (1985).
116. Kotur, supra note 12.
117. Morrisey, supra note 13, at 2124 (“No statistically significant evidence that noneconomic damage
caps exerted any meaningful influence on the cost of employer‐sponsored health insurance”).
118. Perrecone & Fabiano, supra note 114, at 531.
119. Carrie Lynn Vine, Addressing the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Alternatives to Damage
Caps, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 413, 414 (2006).
120. McManus, supra note 8, at 912–13.
121. Id. at 913.
122. Perrecone & Fabiano, supra note 114, at 534.
123. See generally Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012).
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Hilburn period of comparison between Kansas and Missouri.124 Although Missouri
payouts exceeded those in Kansas between 2017 and 2018, Kansas’ increase
tracked the national average, while Missouri’s increase was only 1% higher. 125
The cap-imposed limitation on damages recoverable by aggrieved medical
malpractice plaintiffs, combined with the substantially increased burden felt by physicians, calls into question who actually benefitted from the cap’s protection. Despite the encroachment upon their right to trial by jury, plaintiffs have not reaped
the benefit of these caps, even with assurances that this legislative limitation on
potential judicial remedies would reduce the burden of insurance premiums.126 Nor
have physicians benefitted,127 in spite of the promise of lower premiums for medical
malpractice insurance and a resulting improvement of the quality of healthcare. 128
Some argue this tort reform has done more harm than good:
the burden of this type of legislation “falls exclusively on those extremely
unfortunate victims” who suffer the most serious and catastrophic injuries.
A jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff for a limited amount has not received
full compensation for their injuries if the legislature statutorily, and arbitrarily, caps the recovery at a lesser amount than their actual damages,
without any tangible benefit to consumers.129
Moreover, this impact may be disproportionately borne by those who can least afford it.130 This data and lack of foundational support for the notion that public economic interests are served by the imposition of damage caps undercuts their supposed purpose and calls into question whether such legislation should enjoy extensive deference and technical justification from the judiciary.

VII. TAKE A “BITE” OUT OF CONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENTS
The above suggests that insurance companies have reaped a great benefit from
state courts upholding legislative damage caps. The tenuous fact-law (or procedural-substantive) distinction rests on strained logic and results in extreme hardship
for seriously injured victims, without consequent relief for physicians and other insureds. Missouri and Kansas, among others, have at last curtailed this reasoning and
restored the promise of “inviolate” protection of the right to trial by jury. The
124. Stephen R. Clark, Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety: Missouri and Kansas Supreme Court
Decisions on the Constitutionality of Caps on Noneconomic Damages Demonstrate the Need for Objective Procedures in the Selection of Special Judges, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1441, 1450 (2014) (“The now-stark
difference between the two states will provide an interesting laboratory for studying the effects of noneconomic damages caps in medical malpractice cases on plaintiffs, defendants, medical professionals,
insurance providers, and the judiciary.”).
125. Lily Lieberman, Kansas, Missouri medical malpractice payouts total $78.2M in 2018, KANSAS
CITY
BUSINESS
JOURNAL
(April
4,
2019),
https://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2019/04/04/kansas-missouri-medical-malpractice-payouts-2018.html.
126. See Frech III, supra note 13, at 693
127. McNamus, supra note 121, at 913.
128. Kotur, supra note 12, at 893 ( “The justification for caps on noneconomic damages is to reduce
the cost of medical malpractice insurance, which in turn will retain doctors in the state and strengthen
the quality of healthcare available in the state.”).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 897 (“Reforms in Texas ‘slammed the courthouse doors shut on those who can least afford
it - children, stay-at-home moms and the elderly’”).
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several states still using this logic to maintain a legislative cap regime, especially
those interpreting constitutions containing “inviolate” or similar language, should
look to the reasoning of Watts and Hilburn. After years of experimentation, the results have shown that cap proponents’ fears of astronomical judgments and frivolous lawsuits causing premium spikes were misplaced: the premiums rose anyway.
The dubious nature of caps’ effect on rising premiums also raises questions
regarding statutory presumptions of validity and rational basis review. As discussed
above, Hilburn was decided in the context of a weakened presumption of statutory
validity regarding fundamental constitutional interests. 131 With respect to those fundamental constitutional interests, the presumption of constitutionality no longer applies.132 While Miller held that legislative enactments such as caps are subject to
“rational basis” or clear error review,133 it is clear that abridgments of constitutionally protected rights should be scrutinized for more than “whether a statutory classification bears some rational relationship to a valid legislative purpose.”134 In his
concurring opinion in Hilburn, Judge Stegall highlighted the dispositive nature of
standard of review to his own analysis of the case.135 He wrote that he was “content,
at present, to abandon our clear error standard of review in favor of de novo review
in this case, as set forth by the majority,”136 and suggested that Kansas courts should
do so when any portion of the Kansas Constitution is implicated. 137 In arguing that
Kansas should dispel with clear error review regarding enactments affecting constitutional rights, Judge Stegall discussed “rational basis with bite” review of legislative enactments.138 He also questioned, while postponing an answer, whether Kansas courts should have a mandate to deem statutes unconstitutional when their constitutional violation is not clear “beyond a reasonable doubt.”139
In due process challenges to statutes, most states undergo rational basis analysis, which involves an assessment of the reasonableness of a given statute. 140 Included in this reasonableness inquiry is an assessment of “the social and economic
conditions that existed when the statute was enacted or at the time the case was
decided.”141 Judge Stegall explained this was an appropriate analysis to undergo
regarding the Hilburn § 5 challenge.142 As a piece of “economic legislation,” the
damage cap is properly subject to rational basis review in that it must rationally
relate to a “valid legislative purpose.”143 Under this standard, a court must analyze

131. Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d at 499 (quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 223 Kan.
610 (Kan. 1978)) (“A more stringent test has emerged, however, in cases involving ‘suspect classifications’ or ‘fundamental interests.’”).
132. Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 513 (2019).
133. Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d at 1119.
134. Id.
135. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 52 (Steagall, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
136. Id. at 527.
137. Id. (“Perhaps courts should exercise de novo review over Kansas statutes when any portion of our
Constitution is implicated, not only when judicially favored rights are involved.”).
138. Id. at 529; see also Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d at 550 (“Contrary to modern notions of
‘rational basis’ review, the judicial inquiry demanded by section 1 would look to the actual legislative
record rather than to hypothetical reasons or any possible imagined rationale. The test has occasionally
been described as ‘rational basis with bite.’”).
139. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 528.
140. Maron, supra note 65, at 126.
141. Id.
142. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 529.
143. Clark, supra note 125, at 1449.
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the actual purpose of the legislature in enacting a given statute. 144 However, substantial deference is still required, and it can be difficult to strike down a statute
such as a damage cap even when the apparent purpose—such as lowering premiums
or healthcare costs—is dubious.145
In Miller, the Kansas Supreme Court found that the cap passed muster under
rational basis review, finding it “reasonably conceivable” that the cap furthered “the
objective of reducing and stabilizing insurance premiums by providing predictability and eliminating the possibility of large noneconomic damage awards.” 146 As a
result of this type of analysis, damage caps survive in many states despite courts
remaining “unconvinced of the wisdom of limiting quality of life damages for severely injured victims.”147 Judge Stegall tacitly suggests “rational basis with bite,”
a standard under which “[i]n order to be a constitutional exercise of power, every act
of our Legislature must be rationally related to the furtherance or protection of the
commonwealth.”148 Given that the legislature does not have constitutional authority
to “act in arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory ways,” and that a “rational basis
with bite” standard would entail a hard inquiry into the true purpose of an enactment, Judge Stegall arguably opens the door to an economic analysis of whether
faulty economic platitudes may justify the invalidation of statutes curtailing constitutional rights.149
This heightened scrutiny applied to statutes curtailing substantial rights afforded by constitutional protection would disallow such dubious economic legislation as the caps enacted by the Kansas legislature, with the stated purpose of lowering premiums for consumers and healthcare providers. This legitimate purpose
review could ensure that legislation is rational and non-arbitrary and does not discriminate against the most vulnerable.150 Such a standard could obviate the need for
courts to undergo painstaking analysis of the technical and theoretical differences
between substantive and procedural functions.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The Kansas Supreme Court boldly overturned precedent only seven years old
in its landmark decision in Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., finding that its previous decision in Miller v. Johnson rested on weak foundation. Specifically, the Hilburn majority found that quid pro quo was an insufficient replacement for a constitutionally
guaranteed “inviolate” right to a trial by jury, and although the legislature has the
right to alter the common law, this prerogative does not extend to rights at common
law that have been enshrined in the Kansas Constitution as they existed on the date
144. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 529.
145. Maron, supra note 65, at 130, quoting Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 139 (Utah 2004) (“The court
noted that ‘the empirical truth of these findings is a matter of some dispute’ and it was ‘unconvinced of
the wisdom of limiting quality of life damages for severely injured victims.’ But because the issue was
fairly debatable, the court could not conclude that ‘the legislature [had] overstepped its constitutional
bounds when it determined that there was a crisis needing a remedy.’”).
146. Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1121 (2012).
147. Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 140 (Utah 2004).
148. Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 551 (2019) (Stegall, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (“Applying the necessary deference, a court must examine the actual legislative record to determine the real purpose behind any law in question before it can conclude the law is within the limited
constitutional grant of power possessed by the State.”).
150. Kotur, supra note 12, at 897.
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of ratification. The “fact-law” distinction relied on by Miller and the majority of
courts upholding caps on non-economic damages was appropriately discarded as
legitimate in theory and technicality alone. Hilburn held that stare decisis and presumptions of statutory validity do not pave the way for the legislature to curtail
fundamental constitutional rights. Further, Judge Stegall’s dissenting opinion suggests a more appropriate standard of review for constitutional challenges of this
nature, “rational basis with bite.” Under this standard, courts would be free to assess
economic legitimacy in finding whether an enactment bears a reasonable relation to
the public welfare, and if not, would be able to invalidate the enactment on this
basis alone.
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